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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of a seller’s reputation on pricing in retail e-markets. Our data 
comprises price quotations from over 6000 markets of homogeneous consumer products listed in 
Pricegrabber. We model seller reputations as a combination of the aggregate rating scores and 
ratings histories which are provided by consumers in Pricegrabber’s feedback mechanism. We 
analyze this data with standardized variables regression. The results indicate that there are some 
positive returns on reputation for different seller types which could also explain price dispersion in 
e-markets.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Internet gives consumers unprecedented power in purchase decisions. As the cost of 
search is minimal on the Internet, buyers can easily compare prices at several vendors 
before the purchase decision. While price information becomes more accessible, 
consumers may face other information-related risks in e-commerce. In e-commerce 
transactions, buyers disclose sensitive information, such as credit card details, to sellers. 
Usually it is not possible to verify the quality of merchandise or the identity of the seller. 
Moreover, the delivery of merchandise takes place after the seller has received the 
payment. Facing these problems of asymmetric information, buyers may need some 
assurance that sellers do not cheat them. For this reason, a good reputation or widely 
recognized brand may be a valuable asset in e-commerce.  
 
New online information services have reduced asymmetric in retail e-commerce. To 
make price comparisons more convenient, several companies have started to offer 
comparison shopping services. These websites enable comparison shopping on the 
Internet by providing up-to-date price quotes for various products. Very often these sites 
are equipped with reputation systems which collect and distribute information about the 
past activities of sellers. As a consequence, a comparison shopping website creates highly 
competitive markets for homogeneous goods, where buyers are able to compare prices 
and risks associated with any particular seller. Comparison shopping websites appear to 
be popular. Measured by website traffic, many of them are among the 1000 most visited 
websites on the Internet1. Since large consumer flows can translate into higher revenues, 
firms have a solid financial incentive to participate in comparison shopping markets. In 
addition, comparison shopping websites offer firms market information services on the 
customer base and a low cost method to monitor rivals.  
 
                                                 
1
 Examples of comparison shopping websites include shopping services of portals and search engines such 
as AOL (21), CNET (127), Google (2), MSN (5) and Yahoo (1) and specialized comparison shopping 
websites such as Become.com (2786), Dealtime.com (465), PriceGrabber.com (870) and NexTag (546). 
Global webtraffic rank in parentheses (retrieved July 1st 2008) as reported by Alexa (www.alexa.com) 
which is a company that tracks webtraffic.   
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Comparison shopping markets present a great opportunity to gain insights on market 
structures of e-markets. The determinants of market structure are market concentration, 
product differentiation, conditions of entry and exit and information (Jacobson and 
O’Callaghan-Andréosso, 1996). In comparison shopping markets, products are identical 
and the barriers to entry and exit are low. Therefore, market concentration and 
information will determine market structure. Since market structure determines pricing 
and profits, the market data from comparison shopping markets might help us understand 
how market concentration and information influence competition in e-markets.     
 
The asymmetric information between buyer and seller has inspired numerous researchers 
to inspect the relationship between a seller’s reputation and prices in online auctions. 
Overall, these studies conclude that a good reputation entails some pricing power to a 
seller2. However, burgeoning online retail markets have been largely unnoticed by 
researchers. Baylis and Perloff (2002) study two homogeneous goods e-markets, where 
they find that the firms that provide good service also set lower prices. They also use 
consumers’ quality rankings from an outside source, but it is deemed “largely random 
information, in which case the ratings are worthless.” 
 
This study differs from the previous research because we examine the effect of reputation 
on seller’s pricing in retail e-markets. We use a random sample cross-sectional data from 
over 6000 homogeneous goods markets in a comparison shopping website Pricegrabber3. 
The product categories in the sample include appliances, auto parts, children’s products, 
cameras, computers, electronics, furniture, health and beauty products, indoor living 
products, musical instruments, outdoor living products, software, sporting goods, toys, 
TVs and video games. In addition to price data from these products, our study includes 
data from Pricegrabber’s reputation system which is integrated to the comparison 
shopping service. Buyers elicit feedback on sellers which is reported by the reputation 
system as an aggregated rating score, a ratings history and verbal comments. We use 
quantitative measures to model a seller’s reputation as a combination of its rating score 
                                                 
2
 See Sun (2008) for a concise review of results. 
3
 www.pricegrabber.com . 
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and ratings history. We examine how a seller’s reputation impacts its pricing in 
homogeneous goods markets. More precisely, we ask “Is there returns on reputation in 
retail e-markets?” We also consider the influence of auxiliary variables such as different 
seller types and market concentration on sellers’ pricing. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides theoretical background 
and a brief literature review. In Section 3, we present data descriptions and conduct 
statistical tests and regression analysis. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. TRUST AND REPUTATION IN ONLINE TRANSACTIONS 
 
Asymmetric information between trading agents is pervasive in most markets. Even if 
information is available for free, gathering and processing information is costly. Another 
source of asymmetry stems from contracts that determine the terms of trade. Agents 
cannot be certain that the counterparty fully obliges to the contract. To level 
informational asymmetry, an agent’s reputation becomes an important signal of her 
trustworthiness. Cabral (2005) defines reputation as a situation, when “the agents expect 
a particular agent to be something”, whereas trust is defined as a situation, when “the 
agents expect a particular agent to do something.” 
 
The emergence of trust between trading partners can be formulated with game theory. 
The amount of trust the buyer places on the seller depends on the seller’s reputation 
(Resnick et al., 2000). In other words, the buyer’s beliefs on risks involved in a 
transaction with the seller are based on the assessment of reputation. This can be based on 
a transaction history or learning from other agents. The incentive structure of the game is 
influenced by the threat of retaliation or reciprocity. For example, if the seller cheats the 
buyer (or vice versa), the seller may lose all future transactions with the buyer, or there 
will be legal consequences from a faulty action.  
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Although lower information costs of e-markets could make market incumbents better 
informed about the market in many respects, concerns about the trustworthiness of a 
trading partner become prominent in e-commerce transactions. E-commerce as a means 
of transaction is a fundamental reason for this. In e-commerce, buyers and sellers conduct 
business through a website or other electronic channel. Lack of direct contact between 
buyers and sellers in online transactions leads to uncertainty about the identity of the 
trading partner and product quality (Ba and Pavlou, 2002). More precisely, two main 
concerns are loss of money and privacy (Resnick et al., 2000). Apart from information 
goods, the buyer cannot examine the good before purchase. Moreover, the seller’s online 
store may not give any information about the quality of the seller. Thus, it is harder to 
verify the quality of the good or the seller in e-markets than it is in conventional markets. 
More concerns surface in payment of the purchase. A large bulk of (retail) e-commerce 
transactions are conducted by credit card. Therefore, disclosing sensitive information, 
such as a credit card number, to the seller involves risks of misconduct on behalf of the 
seller. The ease of switching one’s identity on the Internet accentuates these problems. 
The shipping of goods is again problematic because the buyer can only trust that the 
seller obeys the contract they have entered into. This does not mean, however, that the 
buyer is concerned only about the seller’s trustworthiness. Third parties, such as 
criminals or marketing companies, may gain access to sensitive information by stealing 
the information from the seller, by capturing information during the transaction or by the 
seller’s consent. The delivery agency may also lose the ordered purchase which also 
places burden on the buyer-seller relationship.  
 
Trust in transactions is built on reputation. In conventional retail markets, locality of 
transactions is important contributor in reputation building (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 
2002). Since transactions take place in the same physical environment, buyers have 
frequent contacts with the seller. Thus, the seller’s identity is known, and buyers are able 
to inspect the merchandise before purchasing it. They are also able to learn from each 
other’s experiences with the seller, so the word-of-mouth also contributes to the seller’s 
reputation. Moreover, the risks of privacy and shipping are negligible because buyers 
monitor the payment and organize the transportation of the purchased items by 
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themselves. Sellers can also signal reputation by acquiring retail space in an upscale 
location. In addition to location, sellers in conventional markets can borrow reputations 
(certifications), buy reputations (acquisition of an existing brand) or leverage existing 
reputations to new markets.  
 
Due to the lack of physical retail space, the advantages of location in building reputation 
cannot be as large in e-commerce as in conventional retail. Nevertheless, there are some 
parallels in e-markets. Several websites attract large consumer flows daily. First, 
comparison shopping websites such as Bizrate or Pricegrabber provide marketplace 
platforms for e-retailers. Second, on-line auction sites, most notably eBay, are global 
centers of consumer-to-consumer e-commerce as well as a sales channel for small-scale 
e-retailers. Third, web portals such as MSN, Yahoo or CNET offer a wide range of 
services to their customers, and are therefore potential locations to set-up an online store. 
Moreover, some websites that provide services for specific interest groups also support 
platforms for e-commerce. For example, Discogs, an electronic database for 
discographies, offer a marketplace for its members. Finally, well-known e-commerce 
vendors, such as Amazon.com or Play.com, have set-up marketplaces where sellers can 
benefit from the brand and customer base of the marketplace provider.  
 
Due to the risks involved in an e-commerce transaction, consumers require some 
assurance that they can trust the seller. Providing fast shipping and traceability of the 
purchased good, generous guarantees and return policies can also foster trust. Alternative 
ways to pay for the product could also signal trust, because credit cards and some e-
payment solutions such as PayPal provide consumers protection in purchases4. Receiving 
approval ratings from an impartial third party is another way to signal trust. As in 
financial markets, where credit ratings from companies such as Standard & Poor’s serve 
this purpose, e-commerce merchants use certifications from the Internet security 
providers, such as McAfee or VeriSign, to signal that appropriate measures have been 
taken to protect consumers in e-commerce transactions. Other ways to signal trust are not 
as easily verifiable. Easy navigation and a “professional look” of the merchant’s website 
                                                 
4The seller is also protected because the creditor bears the risks of consumer insolvency. 
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could be crucial factors in purchase decisions5. Customer service, ease of contacting the 
seller, effectiveness of communication and consumer empowerment can also be 
important in the reputation building process. Selling items at low prices, at least initially, 
can be used to build a reputation of an inexpensive seller, as frequent transactions are 
instrumental in reputation building among consumers. 
 
Since building a reputation is a dynamic, costly and time-consuming effort, there are 
alternative shortcuts to establish the goal. Established businesses in conventional markets 
often leverage their offline reputations in on-line markets. In this case, the existing 
business model is expanded to e-markets. Another strategy is to buy a reputation by an 
acquisition of an established business or its brand or a franchising agreement. Smaller 
merchants may find it profitable to sell their merchandise under the umbrellas of strong, 
established on-line brands that offer some protection to buyers in their marketplace 
purchases.  
 
To address the problems of asymmetric information, e-commerce marketplaces have 
devised reputation systems that provide information about market incumbents past 
actions. One can think of this as digital word-of-mouth. Resnick (et al. 2000) define a 
reputation system as a system that “collects, distributes and aggregates feedback about 
participants past behavior”. To be effective, a reputation system should be long-lived and 
efficient in distribution of information about reputations. Such a system could alleviate 
asymmetric information between trading partners and encourage behavior that increases 
trust. Participation to a reputation system in itself could signal that an agent is a 
trustworthy trading partner. On the other hand, building a reputation in one marketplace 
creates switching costs for the established sellers because reputations are not transferable 
between competing marketplaces (Melnik and Alm, 2002). For this reason, the 
marketplace operator has an incentive to encourage participation to the marketplace’s 
reputation system because it creates a lock-in for sellers (and buyers, if buyers also act as 
sellers and vice versa). Another way to level the information asymmetry is to collect and 
                                                 
5
 This may not help because websites that have a “professional look” are easy to forge (Kumaraguru et al. 
2006). 
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distribute performance histories. Performance histories are user accounts on interactions 
between buyers and the seller. These are integral part of a feedback mechanism. They 
provide quantitative (e.g. the length of history) and qualitative (e.g. a description about 
the seller/buyer performance) information about a transaction. According to Resnick (et 
al. 2000), performance histories are a tool that enables assessment of the potential risks 
involved in a transaction.  
 
Despite the benefits for the participants of a feedback mechanism, they are not foolproof 
solutions to the problems of asymmetric information. While feedback mechanisms 
usually are based on some quantitative measurements, awarding feedback is subjective. 
As a result, a homogeneous product can receive very different assessments because 
agents are heterogeneous in their preferences. By the law of large numbers, feedback 
converges to some value, but with small amounts of feedback the problem exists. 
Another problem emerges from voluntary participation, because eliciting feedback 
imposes an incremental cost to the trade. This compares to contributing to a public good: 
avoiding the cost of giving feedback creates an incentive to free-ride on the information 
that other agents provide. It is also possible that feedback becomes biased because only 
the extraordinarily bad or good performances are reported. Moreover, the fear of 
retaliation could deter eliciting negative feedback. As reputation systems do not 
distinguish between the monetary values of sold items, it is plausible that a seller amasses 
a good reputation by selling inexpensive items and eventually cheats in a sale of a 
valuable item (Livingston, 2005).  
 
More damaging to the reputation systems could be proliferation of markets for feedback. 
Brown and Morgan (2006) describe situations where feedback mechanisms are 
manipulated by selling merchandise that is essentially worthless in exchange for positive 
feedback. The accumulated positive feedback can then be used to signal good reputation 
in fraudulent listings of valuable items. Another way to go around reputation systems is 
shilling which is forbidden in online marketplaces. For example, a seller could act as a 
buyer and purchase a product from its own online store and then return positive feedback 
for itself.  This could undermine the value of reputation systems for buyers because the 
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inability to manipulate one’s reputation is partly responsible for the value of reputation 
(Standifird, 2001). Distinguishing manipulation from normal business practices may be 
difficult though. For example, a seller offering a used CD for a nominal fee of 1 cent may 
be clearing the inventory, or investing in reputation by offering the merchandise at low 
prices. 
 
A major handicap for reputation building on the Internet is that changing one’s identity is 
relatively costless. For example, creating a new seller identity in online auctions requires 
only registration. In the online retail industry, comparison shopping services such as 
Pricegrabber or Yahoo! offer packages that enable a quick set-up of an online store at low 
costs. While these features guarantee low entry-costs to the market, incomplete and 
asymmetric information between buyers and sellers deters frequent switches of identity. 
If a seller switches its identity, it must start building its reputation again from the 
beginning because the seller ratings and ratings histories are not transferable. For this 
reason, investment costs from reputation building serve as effective entry costs to another 
market. Similarly, online marketplaces create switching costs for the market incumbents 
by not allowing a transfer of reputations between marketplaces (Brown and Morgan, 
2006). Therefore, the marketplace operators have an incentive to encourage sellers into 
positive reputation building, because they gain more sales fees from the locked-in sellers.  
 
The issues of trust and reputation can lead to problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard in e-markets. A strong positive reputation can be seen as an insurance against 
opportunistic behavior (Standifird, 2001). The cost of adverse selection can be that sellers 
receive lower prices for their goods, or even unraveling of the markets in the extreme 
cases (Akerlof, 1970; Dewan and Hsu, 2004). As the full price of a product is a 
combination of a purchase price, search costs and costs of a disappointing purchase, a 
good reputation can mitigate the costs of a disappointing purchase (Kim and Xu, 2007). 
Thus, a reputable seller could enjoy a price premium over its less trustworthy rivals. 
Melnik and Alm (2002) suggest that reputation can raise barriers to entry in an e-market 
because new entrants may find it impossible to compete with the established reputable 
sellers. Indeed, a study of eBay auctions by Lin (et al. 2006) suggests that the population 
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of sellers with high reputation scores has higher growth rate than the sellers with lower 
reputation scores. Interestingly, Professional eBay Sellers Alliance, a trade association of 
high-ranking eBay sellers, complains that exactly the opposite is taking place in eBay, 
because the marketplace does not provide enough incentives for sellers to invest in the 
measures that could provide better reputation6. 
 
Flourishing online auctions have become a popular data source for researchers because 
reputation systems are commonplace in most auction sites. Standifird (2001) finds only 
limited evidence of price premiums for a seller with a good reputation, but a highly 
negative reputation forces a seller to sell items at discount, Furthermore, he finds 
evidence that a negative reputation has more impact on buyers’ purchase decision than a 
positive reputation. This finding is supported by Ba and Pavlou (2002). They find little 
evidence of a positive correlation between rating scores and price premiums, but a 
statistically significant impact of a negative rating on a seller’s price when the auctioned 
items are expensive. In contrast to these findings, Melnik and Alm (2002) show that a 
seller’s reputation has a small positive impact on the prices in the auctions for gold coins. 
They argue that the price premium from reputation is likely to grow along the value of an 
auctioned object. Dewan and Hsu (2004) also report similar findings on a seller’s 
reputation in the collectible stamps auctions. They also estimate that quality uncertainty 
lowers the prices of auctioned stamps by 10-15%. They interpret this as evidence of 
effective dealing with the “lemons problem”. Livingston (2005) finds decreasingly 
increasing returns on seller’s positive reputation in eBay auctions. Using quantile 
regression, Sun and Hsu (2007) detect nonlinear responses to a seller’s reputation: buyers 
place more emphasis on a seller’s reputation when bid values are high.  
 
The impact of e-commerce reputation in the online retail markets has not garnered as 
much attention as the online auctions. In a pioneering study, Baylis and Perloff (2002) 
observe price developments in two homogeneous consumer electronics products. Their 
findings are startling. They observe that “good firms” charge lower prices while “bad 
                                                 
6
 See Professional eBay Sellers Association (2007): “Unhealthy Marketplace Dynamics – Seller 
Perspective”. 
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firms” charge higher prices. Moreover, the relative price positions among firms do not 
change over time, which implies that periodic sales do not take place. Using a survey data 
from customers of an online bookstore, Kim and Xu (2007) find that a seller’s reputation 
can reduce a buyer’s price sensitivity. Another survey by Fuller et al. (2007) suggests that 
the seller ratings, which are provided by a reputation system, do not have a lasting impact 
on a buyer’s decision making. In fact, buyers place more emphasis on direct personal 
experience either from the previous transactions with the seller or the information she 
receives on the seller’s website.  
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
 
The data in this study is a cross-sectional random sample from various product 
categories. These include appliances, auto parts, children’s products, cameras, computers, 
electronics, furniture, health and beauty products, indoor living products, musical 
instruments, outdoor living products, software, sporting goods, toys, TVs and video 
games.  The data was collected from Pricegrabber in May 2008.  
 
Altogether, the sample consists of 6885 different markets for homogeneous goods. 
Descriptive statistics together with variable descriptions are shown in Table 1. The data 
contains information on prices, the number of sellers, seller types, the seller rating scores 
and ratings histories for each market. We use price as the dependent variable in 
regression analysis. The price data consists of 18044 price quotes from homogeneous 
products. All prices are in the United States dollars (USD). The price quotes range from 
0.01 USD to 41049.84 USD with the mean at 394.65 USD and the median at 99.99 USD 
which makes the data positively skewed.  
 
Market thickness measures the number of sellers in a single market. Market thickness 
varies from 1 to 49 with the mean at 2.6, the median at 1 and the standard deviation of 
3.9. Over a half of the markets (3834) were dominated by a single seller at the time of the 
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study. Excluding the single-seller markets increases the mean and the median to 4.7 
sellers in competitive markets with the standard deviation of 5.1. These figures are 
considerably less than the average of 17.5 sellers in a market which Leiter and Warin 
(2007) report. A likely reason for the discrepancy is the sampling method because their 
sample consists of the most popular products in Pricegrabber.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
 
A seller’s rating score is the measure for a seller’s reputation. A rating score is a decimal 
value that ranges from 1 to 5. These are provided by consumers who asses the seller’s 
overall performance in a transaction in 1 (the lowest) to 5 (the highest) scale. As a result, 
the rating score is an aggregate value of the overall consumer opinion on the seller. The 
data set contains rating scores from the past three months (3RATE) and all-time rating 
scores (ARATE). Measured with the standard deviation, 3RATE displays more variation 
than ARATE. Since the mean and median are larger in the three-month scores, this may 
indicate that sellers on average have attempted to improve service. This can be measured 
by RDIF which is calculated by subtracting ARATE from 3RATE. The slightly positive 
median of RDIF verifies that customers feel that service has improved in time. The high 
averages of the rating scores point to a fairly high level of consumer satisfaction, 
however. 
 
Variable Description Mean Median STD Min. Max. 
THICK The number of sellers 
in a market. 
2.62 1 3.85 1 49 
THICK* THICK excluding 
single-seller markets. 
4.66 4.66 5.09 2 49 
PRICE The list price of an item 
in USD. 
394.65 99.99 1049.46 0.01 41049.83 
ARATE Seller’s average 
all-time rating. 
3.99 4.37 0.95 1.00 5.00 
3RATE Seller’s average rating 
during past three months. 
4.00 4.47 1.01 1.00 5.00 
HIST** The number of ratings. 824.22 121.50 2619.88 10 35972 
RDIF The difference between 
3RATE and ARATE. 
-0.19 0.08 0.97 -3.58 3.74 
*Markets with two or more incumbent firms. ** Histories below 10 are not reported. 
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Although the rating scores provide an easily quantifiable measure for seller reputations, 
they are not without limitations. First, each buyer’s assessment on the seller’s 
performance is subjective. Due to buyer heterogeneity, the same level of service may lead 
to different ratings. Second, the rating scores are often accompanied by verbal comments. 
These may contain very important information about the seller’s conduct which is not 
captured by the numerical score. For example, a verbal comment on charging the credit 
card without shipping the purchase or a significant delay in delivery could accompany a 
similar rating, but send a starkly different signal to other buyers. Third, leaving feedback 
is optional, which may lead to biased feedback. This could be a result if only 
exceptionally good or really bad performances become reported. Finally, it may be 
possible for sellers to manipulate their rating scores (Brown and Morgan, 2006). 
However, this may not be as likely in retail as in online auctions because online retailing 
is characterized by large volumes and new merchandise, whereas the items sold in 
auctions are often used and sales volumes are low. 
 
Another way to estimate a seller’s trustworthiness is to include ratings histories in the 
examination. A ratings history provides an indicator of how long the seller has been 
active in the market under the same identity. The longer the ratings history, the more 
reliable the seller is. Descriptive statistics indicate that ratings histories are heavily 
skewed to the left. They range from zero to nearly 36 000 entries with the mean at 
1365.90 and the median at 119. These figures suggest that most sellers are relatively new 
to the market, their sales through the comparison shopping website are low, or their sales 
volumes in the comparison shopping market are low. 
 
Firms of all sizes compete in comparison shopping markets. Pricegrabber has two 
fundamentally different seller types which results from a choice over a sales channel. We 
define “merchants” as the firms that run their own websites. Merchants register to a 
comparison shopping website to lure in customers but process commercial transactions 
through their own e-commerce systems. We define “storefronts” as the firms that do not 
run their own websites. Instead, the comparison shopping website processes commercial 
transactions between consumers and storefronts. Pricegrabber sets its fees in a way that 
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merchants pay a fee for each click-through whether or not this leads to a purchase, but 
storefronts pay fees only for the purchases. The click-through fee for merchants is 
significantly lower than the purchase fee for storefronts7. As a result, large-volume sellers 
benefit from being merchants, whereas low-volume sellers are induced to opt for the 
storefront package. We devise dummy variables to distinguish between different seller 
types. The dummy variable SF takes the value 1 if a seller is a storefront and the value 0 
if a seller is a merchant. Furthermore, dividing the number of storefronts in a market by 
market thickness of the respective market, we obtain a variable for storefront ratio (SFR). 
Further distinctions are based on the level of sales. We use the most recent (2007) annual 
list of The Internet Retailer to separate the large volume sellers from the rest of the seller 
population8. The dummy variable TOP500 takes value 1 if a seller is among the 500 
hundred largest retail e-commerce sellers measured by the value of their annual sales in 
the United States. Thus, the control groups are at the opposite sides of the seller 
spectrum: storefronts are small players in the market, whereas Top500-sellers are 
household names with wide brand recognition among consumers. 
 
A fundamental distinction between markets is the level of their competitiveness. Single-
seller markets were monopolistic, whereas there were two or more sellers in competitive 
markets at the time the observations were made. Descriptive statistics and statistical tests 
on seller reputations based on the market settings are represented in Table 2 and Table 3. 
There is no statistically significant difference between reputations in the seller types that 
operate in the same market setting. In contrast, a statistically significant difference exists 
between the similar seller types that operate in different market settings. On average, 
competitive storefronts have lower reputations than single-seller storefronts. However, 
the mean of single-seller merchants’ reputations is lower than competitive merchants’ 
reputations, but the median is slightly higher. It is obvious that some extremely low rated 
firms cause this. These overall results might constitute evidence that a good reputation 
could deter entry to the markets where the intensity of competition is low. With this data, 
however, the evidence is only suggestive and more research is needed to verify the result. 
                                                 
7
 See http://www.pricegrabber.com/sell_here.php . 
8
 See http://www.internetretailer.com/Top500/list.asp  . 
 14 
 
Table 2. Seller All-time Rating Score Statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. T-Test/Mann-Whitney Test for All-time Rating Score Statistics of Seller Types 
Hypothesis: equal 
mean/median 
T-Test Mann-Whitney Conclusion 
Single-Seller Merchants 
Single-Seller Storefronts 
3.185102** 
 
0.315621 
 
Rejected / Accepted 
Competitve Merchants 
Competitve Storefronts 
0.571521 
 
10.97523*** 
 
Accepted / Rejected 
Single-Seller Storefronts 
Competitive Storefronts 
3.773743*** 
 
4.254029*** 
 
Rejected / Rejected 
Single-Seller Merchants 
Competitive Merchants 
7.009682*** 
 
2.730485*** 
 
 
Rejected / Rejected 
*** indicates a p-value<0.01; ** indicates a p-value<0.05; * indicates a p-value<0.1. 
 
 
To facilitate a direct comparability between different markets, we use standardized 
variables. In general, a standardized variable jiz ,  is obtained by  
 
 )(
,
,
,
ji
jji
ji
xSTD
xx
z
−
= ,        (1) 
 
in which jix ,  is an observation of the variable xi in the market j, jx  is the mean of x in the 
market j and )(
, jixSTD  is the standard deviation of x in the market j. Standardization 
concentrates observations around zero. We denote the standardized variables with the 
letter z in front of the variable. The standardized variables include price (zPRICE), the 
Category Obs. Mean 
 
Median STD Min. Max. 
Competitve 
Merchants 
11391 4.01 
 
4.44 0.91 1.00 5.00 
Competitve 
Storefronts 
1897 4.02 4.06 0.62 1.00 5.00 
Single-seller 
Merchants 
2759 3.86 4.45 1.25 1.00 5.00 
Single-seller 
Storefronts 
108 4.25 4.33 0.42 3.00 5.00 
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all-time rating score (zARATE), the ratings history (zHIST), the difference between the 
rating scores (zRDIF), market thickness (zTHICK) and the storefront ratio (zSFR). As an 
example of standardization, Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of standardized prices. 
The distribution is positively with the median at -0.165 and the mean  at 0.000. The right 
tail is longer than the left tail, because the maximum is 5.327 and the minimum is -2.888.  
 
3.2 OLS REGRESSION 
 
To test the effects that the rating scores, the ratings history and the standardized market 
variables (zSFR, zTHICK) have on sellers’ prices, we devise three regression models. The 
theory suggests that if a good reputation enables a price premium for a seller, estimated 
coefficients for the rating score as a measure of reputation should be positive. In contrast, 
the estimates for the market variables should be negative because increasing competition 
is likely to depress prices. The dummy variables SF and TOP500 separate the effects on 
these specific seller types from the general effects. Moreover, only competitive markets, 
which means that 1>THICK , are considered. We test also if market thickness influences 
results. For this reason, we run five OLS regressions that constrain data-sets to THICK>1 
(A), THICK>5 (B), THICK>10 (C), THICK>20 (D) and 1<THICK<6 (E). We will refer 
to them as A, B, C and D in the text and tabulations. Using the terminology from the 
industrial organization literature, these data-sets can be characterized as “all competitive 
markets” (A), “medium to low concentration” (B), “low concentration” (C), “very low 
concentration” (D) and “high concentration” (E). 
 
Since each regression has problems with heteroscedasticity, we augment the estimates 
with the White’s heteroscedasticity consistent estimates (HSCE). Furthermore, we run 
auxiliary regressions on each variable to detect multicollinearity (the results from these 
are omitted from this paper), which is often problematic in the regression models that 
utilize standardized variables. The variance inflation factors (VIF), which are obtained 
from the auxiliary regressions, suggest that there is no problematic multicollinearity in 
the estimates. The VIFs range from 1.000 to 2.225 with the average values for each 
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regression ranging from 1.005 to 1.517.  We report only the average VIFs for each 
regression.  
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Figure 1. Distribution of Standardized Prices (zPRICE). 
 
In Model 1, we regress the standardized reputation variables (zARATE, zHIST) and their 
interaction on the standardized price (zPRICE). As a consequence of standardization, the 
expected value of the dependent variable equals zero and so, the intercept is omitted from 
the regression equation. However, the unstandardized dummy intercepts are included to 
preserve their meaning. Model 1 becomes 
 
 
εγγ
γηηη
βββαα
+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅++
⋅+⋅+++=
zHISTzARATETOPzHISTzARATESF
zHISTzARATEzHISTTOPzHISTSFzHIST
zARATETOPzARATESFzARATETOPSFzPRICE
32
1321
32121
(2) 
 
The effect of a change in the all-time rating score on the expected standardized price is 
given by Equations (3) to (5) 
 
zHIST
zARATE
TOPSFzPRICEE
11
]0,0|[ γβ +=
∂
==∂
     (3) 
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zHIST
zARATE
TOPSFzPRICEE )(]0,1|[ 2121 γγββ +++=∂
==∂
    (4) 
zHIST
zARATE
TOPSFzPRICEE )(]1,0|[ 3131 γγββ +++=∂
==∂
.    (5) 
 
Since an interaction term is a product of two or more covariates, the effect of a change in 
the value of one covariate depends on the level of the other covariates that compose the 
interaction term. Very often interactions are a product of a dummy variable and a 
continuous variable which gives a straightforward “on/off” interpretation. Such a simple 
interpretation is not possible in our model because the interaction terms include a dummy 
variable and two continuous variables.  
 
As Equations (3) to (5) display, the effect decomposes to the sum of iβ  coefficients (the 
main effect) and the sum of iγ  coefficients multiplied by zHIST (the interaction effect) 
where 3,2,1=i  in both. If the interaction is statistically significant, the effect of zARATE 
on zPRICE is dependent on the level of zHIST. In addition, the main effect should not be 
interpreted in isolation of the interaction effect9. Standardization of the variables makes 
the interpretation somewhat easier. The effect at the average length of the ratings history 
reduces equal to the main effect because the mean of each standardized covariate is zero. 
Rearranging equations (3) to (5) provides results that are easy to interpret. Let Β  and Γ  
denote the sums of iβ  and iγ  where ,3,2,1=i  respectively, in each equation. Setting 
equations (3) to (5) equal to zero and solving any of them for zHIST yields a threshold 
value   
 
 
Γ
Β
=
*zHIST .         (6) 
 
                                                 
9
 For this reason, we refrain from giving any interpretations for 
zHIST
zPRICEE
∂
∂ ][
 because it is difficult to 
interpret the interaction effects. 
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The values greater than the threshold indicate that 0][ >
∂
∂
zARATE
zPRICEE
. Thus the sellers 
whose ratings histories exceed zHIST* reap positive returns on reputation. This also 
implies that the effect is increasing in the length of history. 
 
The results of OLS on Model 1 are reported in Table 4. The dummy variables suggest 
that in the absence of other effects, storefronts set higher prices in A, B and C, whereas 
Top500-sellers set higher prices in A and E but lower in D. The threshold values and 
main effects for Model 1 are shown in Table 5. They indicate that only storefronts and 
Top500-sellers benefit from increases in their rating scores. The threshold values for 
storefronts range from 1.240 (C) to 2.145 (E) which correspond to roughly 1 to 2 STDs. 
This suggests that longer ratings histories are needed in the more concentrated markets 
for the positive effect on price. The effect is opposite for Top500-sellers, for which the 
range is from 0.028 (D) to 8.167 (B). These correspond to 1/3 to 8 standard deviations. 
The latter value is outside the boundaries of the observed ratings histories distribution 
which is displayed in Figure 2. If these theoretical values are removed, Top500-sellers 
have positive returns on reputation only in the more competitive markets in C and D. 
 
Next we examine how improvement in the rating score affects a seller’s pricing. For this 
reason, we regress zRDIF, zHIST and their interaction on zPRICE. Model  2 is  
 
 
εγγ
γηηη
βββαα
+⋅⋅+⋅⋅+
⋅+⋅+⋅++
⋅+⋅+++=
zHISTzRDIFTOPzHISTzRDIFSF
zRDIFzARATEzHISTTOPzHISTSFzHIST
zRDIFTOPzRDIFSFzRDIFTOPSFzPRICE
32
1321
32121
 (7) 
 
and the partial derivatives 
zRDIF
zPRICEE
∂
∂ ][
 are similar to those in Equations (3) to (5). 
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Table 4. OLS Estimates for Model 1. 
Variable A B C D E 
SF 0.258*** 
(0.027) 
0.300*** 
(0.035) 
0.252*** 
(0.076) 
-0.098 
(0.145) 
0.051 
(0.043) 
TOP 0.067*** 
(0.023) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.152** 
(0.072) 
0.177*** 
(0.041) 
zARATE -0.125*** 
(0.017) 
-0.148*** 
(0.021) 
-0.219*** 
(0.029) 
-0.297*** 
(0.043) 
-0.125*** 
(0.030) 
SF*zARATE -0.279*** 
(0.042) 
-0.280*** 
(0.063) 
-0.246* 
(0.133) 
-0.550* 
(0.321) 
-0.126** 
(0.064) 
TOP*zARATE 0.006 
(0.029) 
0.001 
(0.036) 
0.084 
(0.052) 
0.306*** 
(0.108) 
0.117** 
(0.057) 
zHIST -0.028* 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.020) 
0.100*** 
(0.026) 
0.200*** 
(0.045) 
-0.103*** 
(0.029) 
SF*zHIST -0.192*** 
(0.042) 
-0.320*** 
(0.059) 
-0.658*** 
(0.158) 
-1.680*** 
(0.334) 
0.105 
(0.065) 
TOP*zHIST -0.037 
(0.032) 
-0.052 
(0.041) 
-0.160** 
(0.063) 
-0.430*** 
(0.145) 
-0.057 
(0.060) 
zARATE*zHIST -0.187*** 
(0.022) 
-0.258*** 
(0.029) 
-0.361*** 
(0.040) 
-0.499*** 
(0.068) 
-0.066* 
(0.039) 
SF*zARATE 
*zHIST 
0.413*** 
(0.061) 
0.513*** 
(0.095) 
0.736*** 
(0.225) 
0.384 
(0.607) 
0.183** 
(0.088) 
TOP*zARATE 
*zHIST 
0.203*** 
(0.039) 
0.276*** 
(0.052) 
0.434*** 
(0.082) 
0.826*** 
(0.191) 
0.007 
(0.071) 
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.134 0.173 0.227 0.039 
Observations 8916 6668 4201 1826 2248 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1;Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 5. Threshold and Main Effect values for OLS Estimates in Model 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
1 
Seller  
Type 
1β  2β  3β  1γ  2γ  3γ  Threshold Main 
Effect 
All -0.125   -0.187   <-0.668 -0.125 
Storefront -0.125 -0.279  -0.187 0.413  >1.788 -0.404 
 
A 
Top500 -0.125   -0.187  0.203 >7.813 -0.125 
All -0.148   -0.258   <-0.574 -0.148 
Storefront -0.148 -0.280  -0.258 0.513  >1.678 -0.428 
 
B 
Top500 -0.148  0.001 -0.258  0.276 >8.167 -0.147 
All -0.219   -0.361   <-0.607 -0.219 
Storefront -0.219 -0.246  -0.361 0.736  >1.240 -0.465 
 
C 
Top500 -0.219   -0.361  0.434 >3.301 -0.219 
All -0.297   -0.499   <-0.595 -0.297 
Storefront -0.297 -0.550  -0.499   <-1.697 -0.847 
 
D 
Top500 -0.297  0.306 -0.499  0.826 >0.028 0.009 
All -0.125   -0.666   <-0.188 -0.125 
Storefront -0.125 -0.126  -0.666 0.183  >2.145 -0.251 
 
E 
Top500 -0.125  0.117 -0.666   <-0.121 -0.008 
Values outside the observed distribution in italics. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Standardized Ratings Histories (zHIST). 
 
The OLS estimates for Model 2 are reported in Table 6. The magnitude of the dummy 
variables is greater than in Model 1. They suggest again that storefronts and Top500-
sellers set higher prices than the general seller population. The threshold values and main 
effects can be found in Table 7. First, we notice that the interactions are statistically 
significant only for Top500-sellers. The estimates are negative, which indicates that 
improvement in the ratings score does not offer positive returns. Second, the estimates for 
the rating scores are also negative for the control groups. Only the group that contains all 
sellers displays positive estimates for coefficients on zARATE in A, B, C and E. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients range from 0.031 (C) to 0.142 (E). These magnitudes 
imply that improvement in the rating score provides a price premium of approximately 
15% of STD in the high concentration markets.   
 
Model 3 is built on Model 1 and Model 2. We base the model on zARATE, zHIST and 
their interaction. Since the product of zRDIF and zHIST was statistically significant only 
for Top500-sellers, we omit the interaction term and include only zRDIF into Model 3. 
To provide a more comprehensive view on competition, we include the market variables 
zTHICK and zSFR into the regression equation. Model 3 is 
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Table 6. OLS Estimates for Model 2. 
Variable A B C D E 
SF 0.337*** 
(0.029) 
0.384*** 
(0.035) 
0.346*** 
(0.058) 
-0.080 
(0.158) 
0.083 
(0.051) 
TOP 0.115*** 
(0.020) 
0.097*** 
(0.024) 
0.071** 
(0.032) 
0.035 
(0.046) 
0.163*** 
(0.037) 
zRDIF 0.066*** 
(0.012) 
0.049*** 
(0.013) 
0.031** 
(0.015) 
0.023 
(0.021) 
0.142*** 
(0.027) 
SF*zRDIF -0.264*** 
(0.070) 
-0.356*** 
(0.103) 
-0.335* 
(0.178) 
-1.892** 
(0.754) 
-0.202** 
(0.094) 
TOP*zRDIF -0.124*** 
(0.023) 
-0.112*** 
(0.025) 
-0.079** 
(0.031) 
-0.108** 
(0.044) 
-0.200*** 
(0.051) 
zHIST -0.109*** 
(0.011) 
-0.107*** 
(0.013) 
-0.088*** 
(0.015) 
-0.069*** 
(0.019) 
-0.133*** 
(0.028) 
SF*zHIST -0.189*** 
(0.044) 
-0.246*** 
(0.055) 
-0.521*** 
(0.108) 
-1.620*** 
(0.380) 
0.061 
(0.077) 
TOP*zHIST -0.047** 
(0.023) 
-0.044* 
(0.025) 
-0.055* 
(0.031) 
-0.054 
(0.044) 
-0.042 
(0.055) 
zRDIF*zHIST -0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.009 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
0.023 
(0.036) 
SF*zRDIF 
*zHIST 
0.099 
(0.099) 
0.127 
(0.146) 
0.301 
(0.291) 
-1.708 
(1.497) 
0.047 
(0.131) 
TOP*zRDIF 
*zHIST 
-0.100*** 
(0.027) 
-0.100*** 
(0.030) 
-0.104*** 
(0.037) 
-0.147** 
(0.060) 
-0.100 
(0.063) 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.088 0.107 0.148 0.035 
Observations 8788 6650 4201 1826 2138 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1;Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Table 7. Threshold values and Main Effects for OLS Estimates in Model 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
2 
Seller 
 Type 
1β  2β  3β  1η  2η  3η  Threshold Main 
Effect 
All 0.066       0.066 
Storefront 0.066 -0.264      -0.198 
 
A 
Top500 0.066  -0.124   -0.100 <-0.580 -0.058 
All 0.049       0.049 
Storefront 0.049 -0.356      -0.307 
 
B 
Top500 0.049  -0.112   -0.100 <-0.630 -0.063 
All 0.031       0.031 
Storefront 0.031 -0.335      -0.304 
 
C 
Top500 0.031  -0.079   -0.104 <-0.462 -0,048 
All         
Storefront  -1.892      -1.892 
 
D 
Top500   -0.108   -0.147 <-0.735 -0.108 
All 0.142       0.142 
Storefront 0.142 -0.202      -0.060 
 
E 
Top500 0.142  -0.200     -0.058 
Values outside the observed distribution in italics. 
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The partial derivatives describing the interaction effects are the same as in Equations (3) 
to (5). 
 
The OLS estimates for Model 3 are presented in Table 8, and the threshold values and 
main effects are presented in Table 9. The estimated coefficients for the intercept dummy 
variables do not differ much from those in Model 1 and Model 2. As in Model 1, the 
interaction effects show that only storefronts and Top500-sellers enjoy positive returns on 
reputation. The magnitudes of the thresholds range from 1.129 (C) to 3.641 (A) for 
storefronts. This means that a lower threshold level of zHIST is required for positive 
returns in the high concentration markets. The pattern is not as straightforward for 
Top500-sellers. The range for them spans from 0.358 (D) to 3.292 in A if we omit 6.125 
(B) which is out of the bounds. This means that only Top500-sellers have returns on 
reputation in the highly competitive markets. Moreover, a length of history that is 
modestly above the average is needed for a price premium. In contrast, the main effects 
are negative for all sellers indicating that more favorable rating scores do not provide 
pricing power at the average level of ratings history.  
 
The total effects on other variables are reported in Table 10. The general seller population 
seems to benefit only from improvement in rating scores. The positive coefficients range 
from 0.036 to 0.140 in B to E indicating a more powerful effect in the high concentration 
markets. Since the estimates for Top500-sellers are statistically insignificant, they share 
the estimated coefficients of the general population in C and D. The coefficients for 
storefronts are negative everywhere. 
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Table 8. OLS Estimates for Model 3. 
Variable A B C D E 
SF 0.460*** 
(0.057) 
0.539*** 
(0.069) 
0.577*** 
(0.122) 
0.215 
(0.316) 
0.193 
(0.232) 
TOP 0.091*** 
(0.025) 
0.075** 
(0.036) 
0.048 
(0.062) 
0.136 
(0.147) 
0.504 
(0.168) 
zARATE -0.079*** 
(0.017) 
-0.079*** 
(0.022) 
-0.097*** 
(0.031) 
-0.095** 
(0.045) 
-0.082*** 
(0.031) 
SF*zARATE -0.347*** 
(0.046) 
-0.356*** 
(0.065) 
-0.332*** 
(0.127) 
-0.860*** 
(0.304) 
-0.206*** 
(0.073) 
TOP*zARATE -0.041 
(0.029) 
-0.068* 
(0.037) 
-0.057 
(0.054) 
0.048 
(0.098) 
0.075 
(0.057) 
zHIST -0.043*** 
(0.015) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
0.010 
(0.026) 
0.033 
(0.041) 
-0.107*** 
(0.029) 
SF*zHIST -0.109** 
(0.046) 
-0.177*** 
(0.062) 
-0.374*** 
(0.145) 
-1.007*** 
(0.338) 
0.065 
(0.074) 
TOP*zHIST -0.008 
(0.032) 
-0.004 
(0.042) 
-0.044 
(0.063) 
-0.206* 
(0.122) 
-0.039 
(0.059) 
zRATE*zHIST -0.143*** 
(0.023) 
-0.171*** 
(0.030) 
-0.184*** 
(0.042) 
-0.180** 
(0.070) 
-0.063 
(0.039) 
SF*zRATE*zHIST 0.260*** 
(0.068) 
0.335*** 
(0.099) 
0.564*** 
(0.212) 
-0.198 
(0.589) 
0.120 
(0.105) 
TOP*zRATE*zHIST 0.169*** 
(0.040) 
0.195*** 
(0.053) 
0.260*** 
(0.082) 
0.445*** 
(0.165) 
-0.005 
(0.070) 
zRDIF -0.068*** 
(0.012) 
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
0.036** 
(0.014) 
0.033* 
(0.020) 
0.140*** 
(0.029) 
SF*zRDIF -0.217*** 
(0.062) 
-0.221*** 
(0.085) 
-0.249* 
(0.139) 
-0.757** 
(0.335) 
-0.193** 
(0.094) 
TOP*zRDIF -0.086*** 
(0.023) 
-0.062** 
(0.025) 
0.009 
(0.031) 
0.018 
(0.049) 
-0.192*** 
(0.053) 
zTHICK -0.086*** 
(0.011) 
-0.089*** 
(0.011) 
-0.088*** 
(0.013) 
-0.069*** 
(0.016) 
0.099** 
(0.044) 
SF*zTHICK 0.191*** 
(0.029) 
0.146*** 
(0.034) 
0.109** 
(0.045) 
0.073 
(0.082) 
0.208 
(0.388) 
TOP*zTHICK 0.058*** 
(0.020) 
0.063*** 
(0.024) 
0.074** 
(0.032) 
0.018 
(0.053) 
0.538* 
(0.305) 
zSFR -0.061*** 
(0.016) 
-0.078*** 
(0.021) 
-0.077*** 
(0.029) 
-0.146*** 
(0.055) 
-0.052* 
(0.028) 
SF*zSFR -0.133*** 
(0.035) 
-0.158*** 
(0.042) 
-0.257*** 
(0.064) 
-0.127 
(0.188) 
0.056 
(0.066) 
TOP*zSFR -0.065** 
(0.031) 
-0.056 
(0.039) 
-0.153*** 
(0.058) 
-0.275** 
(0.111) 
-0.058 
(0.050) 
Adjusted R2 0.134 0.160 0.204 0.257 0.054 
Observations 8784 6650 4201 1826 2134 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
The market variables display mixed results. The standardized measure for market 
thickness, zTHICK, is statistically significant and negative in A to D but positive in E. 
The negative estimates indicate that an increase in market thickness by one standard 
deviation decreases prices approximately 0.07 (D) to 0.09 (B) standard deviations. The 
positive coefficient implies that price increases by 0.1 standard deviations in the low 
 24 
concentration markets. The control groups show a different pattern. The estimates for 
storefronts are statistically significant and positive in A to C, where the total effect ranges 
from 0.105 to 0.109. The estimates for Top500-sellers are also statistically significant in 
A to C and E. Except for 0.637 in E, the magnitudes are lower ranging from -0.028 (A) to 
0.063 (B). This evidence suggests that neither storefronts nor Top500-sellers resort to 
price cuts when the number of market incumbents increases. 
 
Table 9. Threshold values and Main Effects for OLS Estimates in Model 3 (OLS). 
Model 
3 
Seller 
Type 
1β  2β  3β  1γ  2γ  3γ  Threshold 
 
Main 
Effect 
All -0.079   -0.143   <-0.552 -0.079 
Storefront -0.079 -0.347  -0.143 0.260  >3.641 -0.426 
 
A 
Top500 -0.079   -0.143  0.167 >3.292 -0.079 
All -0.079   -0.171   <-0.462 -0.079 
Storefront -0.079 -0.356  -0.171 0.335  >2.652 -0.435 
 
B 
Top500 -0.079  -0.068 -0.171  0.195 >6.125 -0.079 
All -0.097   -0.184   <-0.527 -0.097 
Storefront -0.097 -0.332  -0.184 0.564  >1.129 -0.429 
 
C 
Top500 -0.097   -0.184  0.564 >1.276 -0.097 
All -0.095   -0.180   <-0.528 -0.095 
Storefront -0.095 -0.860  -0.180   <-5.306 -0.955 
 
D 
Top500 -0.095   -0.180   >0.358 -0.095 
All -0.082       -0.082 
Storefront -0.082 -0.206      -0.288 
 
E 
Top500 -0.082       -0.082 
Values outside the observed distribution in italics. 
 
The storefront ratio, zSFR, provides more theoretically sound results than market 
thickness. The estimates for all sellers range from -0.052 (E) to -0.146 (D) which 
suggests that the number of storefronts in the market is a more significant driver for price 
cuts. The estimates for storefronts and Top500-sellers show starker results. The total 
effect for storefronts ranges from -0.052 (E) to -0.334 (D). The effect on Top500-sellers 
ranges from -0.052 (E) to -0.421 (D).  These magnitudes suggest that an increase in the 
storefront ratio erodes prices more effectively than an increase in market thickness 
especially in more competitive markets.  
 
 
 
 25 
Table 10. Total Effects in Model 3 (OLS). 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 QUANTILE REGRESSION 
 
Quantile Regression (QR) is a semiparametric estimation method. The strength of QR is 
that it is robust to outliers in data (Koenker & Hallock 2001). A special case of QR is 
median regression, which is a semiparametric counterpart to OLS. As the name suggests, 
median regression reveals only a fraction of the information that QR can provide. With 
QR, it is possible to get estimates for coefficients across the conditional distribution of 
the dependent variable.  
 
As an application of QR, we estimate Model 3 with QR. We use the data set A because it 
is the broadest market setting. The estimates are for the 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 
quantiles10. These figures are also used in making references to specific quantiles. The 
estimated coefficients are reported in Table 11. 
 
                                                 
10
 We refer to the 0.1 quantile as the lower tail and the 0.9 quantile as the upper tail. The other quantiles are 
referred to as the first quartile (0.25), the median (0.5) and the third quartile (0.75). 
Model 
3 
Seller 
Type 
zRdif zTHICK zSFR 
All -0.068 -0.086 -0.061 
Storefront -0.285 0.105 -0.194 
 
0.1 
Top500 -0.154 -0.028 -0.126 
All 0.059 -0.089 -0.078 
Storefront -0.162 0.146 -0.236 
 
0.25 
Top500 -0.003 0.063 -0.078 
All 0.036 -0.088 -0.077 
Storefront -0.213 0.109 -0.334 
 
0.5 
Top500 0.036 -0.014 -0.230 
All 0.033 -0.069 -0.146 
Storefront -0.724 -0.069 -0.146 
 
0.75 
Top500 0.033 -0.069 -0.421 
All 0.140 0.099 -0.052 
Storefront -0.053 0.099 -0.052 
 
0.9 
Top500 -0.052 0.637 -0.052 
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The interaction effect of zARATE*zHIST and the main effect of zARATE are reported in 
Table 12. The QR estimates reveal that the interaction effect shows great variation in 
different points of the price distribution. Only storefronts that have a long ratings history 
(>3.920 and >2.361, respectively) have positive returns on reputation in the lower tail and 
the first quartile. The threshold value is positive for Top500-sellers at the median but the 
magnitude is out of bounds. So, no firm realizes benefits from a good reputation around 
the middle of the price distribution. In the third quartile and the upper tail, all firms 
realize positive returns on reputation. For the general seller population these values are 
below the mean because the thresholds are -0.924 (0.75) and -0.690 (0.9). Storefronts and 
Top500-sellers have realistic threshold values only in the third quartile. The magnitude is 
very high (4.217) for storefronts but less so (1.511) for Top500-sellers. In the upper tail, 
their threshold values are out of bounds. 
 
The effects of other variables are reported in Table 13. The QR estimates for zRDIF 
reveal that the effect is not uniform across the distribution. For all sellers, the effect is 
statistically significant and positive at and above the median. The values range from 
0.058 (0.5) to 0.165 (0.9) which corresponds to 6% to 17% increase in price when zRDIF 
increases by one standard deviation. The effect on storefronts is negative in the 0.5 and 
0.75 quantiles. The total effect on Top500-sellers is mildly negative (-0.025) at the 
median, whereas at and above the third quartile the effect is slightly positive. This 
evidence suggests that the positive impact of an improved reputation is more effective 
above the median. 
 
The QR estimates reveal interesting qualities about the market variables. The OLS 
estimates suggested that market thickness is negative only for the general seller 
population. The QR estimates alter this view because also Top500-sellers are negative 
and statistically significant above the median. This implies that an increase in the number 
of market incumbents erodes pricing power among the higher priced sellers. The 
storefront ratio shows a constant negative pattern among all sellers. As with market 
thickness, an increase in zSFR is felt more heavily in the upper tail of the price 
distribution. 
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Table 11. QR Estimates for Model 3 (A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
SF -0.910*** 
(0.058) 
-0.461*** 
(0.075) 
0.463*** 
(0.089) 
1.308*** 
(0.080) 
1.955*** 
(0.097) 
TOP -0.827*** 
(0.030) 
-0.509*** 
(0.029) 
0.137*** 
(0.039) 
0.636*** 
(0.031) 
1.044*** 
(0.035) 
zRATE -0.492*** 
(0.021) 
-0.325*** 
(0.021) 
-0.135*** 
(0.026) 
0.085*** 
(0.028) 
0.238*** 
(0l021) 
SF*zRATE 0.100** 
(0.047) 
-0.100* 
(0.055) 
-0.446*** 
(0.063) 
-0.473*** 
(0.069) 
-0.452*** 
(0.078) 
TOP*zRATE 0.400*** 
(0.034) 
0.246*** 
(0.032) 
0.027 
(0.044) 
-0.224*** 
(0.041) 
-0.441*** 
(0.037) 
zHIST 0.197*** 
(0.020) 
0.117*** 
(0.020) 
0.021 
(0.025) 
-0.154*** 
(0.022) 
-0.263*** 
(0.015) 
SF*zHIST -0.338*** 
(0.043) 
-0.319*** 
(0.067) 
-0.142** 
(0.059) 
0.043 
(0.093) 
0.150 
(0.105) 
TOP*zHIST -0.173*** 
(0.035) 
-0.160*** 
(0.036) 
-0.093* 
(0.048) 
0.083* 
(0.044) 
0.213*** 
(0.032) 
zRATE*zHIST -0.777*** 
(0.034) 
-0.513*** 
(0.032) 
-0.199*** 
(0.038) 
0.092** 
(0.038) 
0.345*** 
(0.030) 
SF*zRATE*zHIST 0.877*** 
(0.061) 
0.693*** 
(0.097) 
0.194** 
(0.082) 
0.039 
(0.109) 
-0.319** 
(0.125) 
TOP*zRATE*zHIST 0.653*** 
(0.046) 
0.452*** 
(0.048) 
0.211*** 
(0.062) 
0.009 
(0.060) 
-0.243*** 
(0.052) 
zRDIF -0.002 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.058*** 
(0.016) 
0.109*** 
(0.014) 
0.165*** 
(0.012) 
SF*zRDIF -0.004 
(0.064) 
0.014 
(0.102) 
-0.321*** 
(0.071) 
-0.223** 
(0.094) 
-0.230 
(0.173) 
TOP*zRDIF -0.062* 
(0.034) 
-0.089*** 
(0.024) 
-0.083*** 
(0.027) 
-0.093*** 
(0.031) 
-0.137*** 
(0.032) 
zTHICK -0.363*** 
(0.011) 
-0.262*** 
(0.010) 
-0.150*** 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.015) 
0.155*** 
(0.014) 
SF*zTHICK 0.444*** 
(0.039) 
0.384*** 
(0.041) 
0.225*** 
(0.039) 
0.050 
(0.035) 
0.063 
(0.114) 
TOP*zTHICK 0.394*** 
(0.023) 
0.290*** 
(0.019) 
0.068*** 
(0.023) 
-0.116*** 
(0.029) 
-0.242*** 
(0.035) 
zSFR -0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.040* 
(0.020) 
-0.096*** 
(0.025) 
-0.156*** 
(0.050) 
-0.148*** 
(0.017) 
SF*zSFR -0.064 
(0.040) 
-0.049 
(0.043) 
-0.113** 
(0.051) 
-0.156*** 
(0.050) 
-0.143*** 
(0.052) 
TOP*zSFR -0.056 
(0.040) 
-0.010 
(0.032) 
0.146**** 
(0.042) 
-0.023 
(0.056) 
0.082* 
(0.044) 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1;Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 12. Threshold values and Main Effects for QR Estimates in Model 3.   
Model 
3QR 
Seller 
Type 
1β  2β  3β  1γ  2γ  3γ  Threshold 
 
Main 
Effect 
All -0.492   -0.777   <-0.633 -0.492 
Storefront -0.492 0.100  -0.777 0.877  >3.920 -0.392 
 
0.1 
Top500 -0.492  0.400 -0.777  0.653 <-0.742 -0.092 
All -0.325   -0.513   <-0.634 -0.325 
Storefront -0.325 -0.100  -0.513 0.693  >2.361 -0.425 
 
0.25 
Top500 -0.325  0.246 -0.513  0.452 <-1.295 -0.079 
All -0.135   -0.199   <-0.678 -0.135 
Storefront -0.135 -0.446  -0.199 0.194  <-116.200 -0.581 
 
0.5 
Top500 -0.135   -0.199  0.211 >11.250 -0.135 
All 0.085   0.092   >-0.924 0.085 
Storefront 0.085 -0.473  0.092   >4.217 -0.388 
 
0.75 
Top500 0.085  -0.224 0.092   >1.511 -0.139 
All 0.238   0.345   >-0.690 0.238 
Storefront 0.238 -0.452  0.345 -0.319  >8.231 -0.214 
 
0.9 
Top500 0.238  -0.441 0.345  -0.319 >7.808 -0.203 
Values outside the observed distribution in italics. 
 
 
Table 13. Total Effects in Model 3 (QR). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
3QR 
Seller 
Type 
zRdif zTHICK zSFR 
All  -0.363  
Storefront  0.081  
 
0.1 
Top500 -0.062 0.031  
All  -0.262 -0.040 
Storefront  0.122 -0.040 
 
0.25 
Top500 -0.089 0.028 -0.040 
All 0.058 -0.150 -0.096 
Storefront -0.263 0.075 -0.209 
 
0.5 
Top500 -0.025 0.082 -0.242 
All 0.109  -0.137 
Storefront -0.114  -0.293 
 
0.75 
Top500 0.016 -0.116 -0.137 
All 0.165 0.155 -0.242 
Storefront 0.165 0.155 -0.390 
 
0.9 
Top500 0.028 -0.087 -0.160 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
These results suggest that the number of firms in the market plays an important part in 
consumer decision making process. The pricing decisions of the firms reflect this. Model 
1 suggests that good ratings may provide returns on reputation for storefronts and 
Top500-sellers. These are, however, contingent on the length of the ratings history. An 
increase in market thickness lowers the threshold length, but only Top500-sellers seem to 
be able to set higher prices in very competitive markets. Model 2 examined the effect of 
an improved rating score on sellers’ pricing. The interaction term proved statistically 
insignificant but a small positive effect for the general seller population surfaced. In 
Model 3, we included the market variables into the regression equation. The results for 
reputation variables paralleled the results obtained in Model 1 and Model 2. The market 
variables indicated that the number of storefronts in a market reduced price levels more 
than an increase in market thickness. Quantile regression estimates do not change the 
general results, but they demonstrate that also the general seller population has returns on 
reputation in the upper tail of the price distribution. 
 
There are few plausible explanations for the results. First, consumers may consider price 
as a less important decision variable when market thickness increases. If reputation 
matters in consumer decision making, then price dispersion could emerge. The sellers 
with better reputations could charge higher prices. This can be demonstrated by a scatter 
plot with a kernel regression that plots the value of information (VI), which measures the 
monetary value of price information, against market thickness. Figure 3 depicts a kernel 
fit between market thickness and the value of (price) information which is one measure 
for price dispersion. We use a relative measure for VI given by 
 
 
min
min
j
jj
p
pp
VI
−
= ,        (8) 
 
in which VI is a percentage of the difference between the expected price and the 
minimum price in a market j (Baye et. al 2003). Naturally, the value of information is 
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zero in single-seller markets. Figure 3 suggests that VI increases rapidly initially and 
levels off as market thickness reaches approximately 10 (the fit curve decreases again in 
the right tail but the small number of observations explains this). This means that price 
dispersion increases even though price information is perfect. These results are 
comparable to Baye et al. (2003) who discovered a positive correlation between VI and 
the number of firms with similar magnitudes in the online consumer electronics markets. 
These differences in prices could partially result from the returns on reputation for 
storefronts and Top500-sellers in the more competitive markets. Second, the likelihood 
that a consumer encounters a familiar firm increases as the number of firms increases. 
Thus, earlier successful transactions could weigh in consumer decision making which 
could give support to price dispersion. According to Grover (et al. 2006) information 
overload – too much information to process – might cause consumers to buy only at 
known firms. 
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Figure 3. Scatter Plot with Kernel Regression on Value of Information and Market 
Thickness 
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Another explanation for the differences could be that the value of merchandise 
determines the importance of the seller’s reputation in a purchase decision. It is plausible 
that consumers place a different value on reputation in more valuable items such as 
televisions than in purchases of a relatively low value such as deodorants. Statistics of 
sellers’ prices in competitive markets are laid out in Table 14. They show that the mean 
(279.90) and range (8449.01) of storefronts’ prices is considerably less than Top500-
sellers or sellers in general. The difference in the median prices is less severe but still 
clear. The statistical tests in Table 15 prove that on average, storefronts focus on items 
that are of lower value, because the mean and median prices are lower than those of the 
other two seller types. While the means of Top500-sellers and other sellers are equal, 
their medians are not. This implies that Top500-sellers sell more valuable items than the 
other sellers. As the value of a purchased item increases, consumers could become more 
risk averse and consider a seller’s reputation as an insurance against fraudulent behavior. 
Thus, consumers are willing to pay a price premium for a homogenous item to a more 
reputable seller. 
 
Table 14. Prices in Competitive Markets. 
 
Statistic Other Sellers Storefronts Top500-Sellers 
Mean 423.89 279.90 426.07 
Median 111.12 85.00 149.99 
Maximum 16797.59 8450.00 16265.20 
Minimum 0.01 0.99 0.93 
Std. Dev. 962.81 535.48 881.98 
Skewness 7.53 4.90 8.08 
Kurtosis 91.00 43.09 110.55 
Jarque-Bera 3215223. 154222.7 1159607. 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Observations 9681 2173 2353 
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Table 15. T-Test/Mann-Whitney Test for Prices of Seller Types. 
Hypothesis: equal 
mean/median 
T-test Mann-Whitney Result 
Storefronts  
Top500-sellers 
-6.673*** 
 
9.512*** Rejected / Rejected 
Storefronts  
Other Sellers 
-6.741*** 5.054*** Rejected / Rejected 
Top500-sellers  
Other Sellers 
-0.100 6.145*** Accepted / Rejected 
*** p-value<0.01; ** p-value<0.05; * p-value<0.1. 
 
 
Overall, these results show that a reputation score does not enable major price premiums. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to compare our results to those obtained from the auction 
markets because of fundamental differences in retailing and auctions. The closest 
comparison is Bayliss and Perloff (2002) who find that favorable third party ratings have 
no effect on prices. They conclude that there is no premium associated with the ratings: 
“bad firms” charge higher prices than “good firms”. Our findings do not agree with this 
entirely. Since the average rating score is over 4 in a scale of 1 to 5, the number of “bad 
firms” in the market is not very large. Nevertheless, it is possible that small differences in 
rating scores and ratings histories do matter. The main effect of the rating score on prices 
is negative, which could support the findings of Bayliss and Perloff. However, our 
evidence shows that Top500-sellers and storefronts with better reputations and longer 
histories charge higher prices than sellers in general. Quantile regression reveals that all 
sellers benefit from better reputations in the upper quartile of the price distribution. Brand 
recognition could explain the effect on Top500-sellers but not on storefronts. Specializing 
in niche product categories might explain it for them, but this study does not differentiate 
between product categories, nor do we have data to make the distinction.  
 
Our evidence indicates also that the number of sellers in the market have an impact on 
pricing. More precisely, the number of storefronts seem to affect more than pure number 
of sellers. There could be a simple explanation for this. As storefronts sell their products 
only through the comparison shopping website, they have a larger propensity to enter into 
price competition. For other sellers, a comparison shopping website is a way to attract 
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more price-conscious customers, while they may derive a larger bulk of sales elsewhere. 
For this reason, they have no interest in entering price competition for the informed 
consumers who look for bargains by comparison shopping. Instead, the market for them 
resembles the situations described in Salop and Stiglitz (1977) and Varian (1980), where 
the informed customers pay lower prices and the uninformed pay higher prices and 
occasionally a firm charges the lowest price universally by organizing a sale or just by 
being lucky.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we examined the effect of reputation on pricing in retail e-commerce. In our 
model, a seller’s reputation is measured by its rating score and ratings history, which are 
aggregated from the consumer feedback. We controlled for two seller types, storefronts 
and Top500-sellers, based on their level of sales and choice over a sales channel. 
Moreover, the variables that characterize competition in markets were included in the 
regression models. We used OLS and quantile regression to estimate the regression 
models with different data-sets. 
 
Our findings indicate that there are some positive returns on reputation in retail e-
commerce. These are contingent on the length of the seller’s ratings history. A long 
presence in the marketplace seems to allow premium pricing for the controlled seller 
types Top500-sellers and storefronts. Quantile regression indicates that returns on 
reputation concentrate to the upper quartile of the price distribution. We also find that the 
number of sellers in the market seem to affect pricing by decreasing the length of the 
required ratings history. As price dispersion in markets increases with the number of 
sellers in the market, seller reputations may be one cause for the emergence of price 
dispersion in highly competitive markets. 
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